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Measuring user innovation in Dutch high tech SMEs: 
Frequency, nature and transfer to producers 
 
 
Abstract 
 
A detailed survey of 498 “high tech” SMEs in the Netherlands shows process 
innovation by user firms to be common practice.  Fifty four percent of these relatively 
small firms reported developing entirely novel process equipment or software for their 
own use and/or modifying these at significant private expense. Twenty five percent of 
the user innovations in our sample were transferred to commercializing producer firms. 
Many transfers were made without any direct compensation, i.e. 48% were simply given 
away.  
Very importantly from the perspective of effective diffusion of user innovations, 
innovations with higher commercial potential for producers – and with more general 
appeal for users - are much more likely to be transferred.  The pattern we document of 
frequent innovation by individual user firms at substantial cost, followed in many cases 
by voluntary, no-charge information spillovers to producers, suggests that “open source 
economics” may be a general pattern in the economy.   
Keywords 
User innovation, SME innovation, innovation transfer, innovation diffusion, innovation 
measurement, open source.  
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Measuring user innovation in Dutch high tech SMEs: 
Frequency, nature and transfer to producers 
 
1. Introduction and overview 
 Empirical research by innovation scholars has now clearly documented that many 
of the innovative products we buy from producers are in fact developed, prototyped, tested 
and improved by “lead users.”  These individuals and firms often innovate in order to 
solve their own, ahead-of-market needs.  Later, when a commercially-attractive market 
emerges for these products, producers adopt or learn from products lead users have 
already developed as an important feedstock to their own product development and 
commercialization efforts. 
 While the importance of lead users as a feedstock of product design and use 
information is now generally understood, little is known about the crucial process by 
which user-developed innovations are transferred to producers, and about the terms under 
which such transfers are effected.  In this paper, we explore these matters.  
Our empirical findings are based upon analyses of a sample of 498 Dutch ‘high-
tech’ small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), a sample spanning a broad range of 
industries. In brief overview, we find that 54% of these high tech SMEs report 
developing new and/or modifying existing process equipment or software for in-house 
use within the last 3 years. The average cost incurred by a user firm in our sample to 
develop its most recent process innovation was €235 000, and the average cost for the 
most recent process modification was €119 800 – significant amounts for these 
relatively small firms.  
 With respect to transfer of the user-developed innovations to producers, our major 
findings are that 25% of the most recent process innovations users had developed were 
now being produced by equipment producers or software vendors for commercial sale. 
The innovations transferred tended to be those of stronger and more general interest to 
users, and thus of more value to producers as commercial products.  Further, a total of 
48% percent of these innovations were given to producers by users at no charge.  
 User-innovators in our sample do not appear to be broadcasting free information 
regarding their innovations to all and sundry.  Indeed, most indicate that they are not in 
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favor of general diffusion of their information at no charge.  Instead, many appear to be 
narrowcasting information about their innovations to equipment producers which whom 
they have a preexisting relationship.  Still, the end result is that their innovation is made 
available to the entire user population – because their selected producer puts it on the 
market as a commercial product.   
 In net, free innovation transfer seems more widespread in the economy than has 
been heretofore understood.  The transfer patterns we observe have some interesting 
similarities to those usually associated with open source software innovations, and it 
seems reasonable that similar economic justifications could apply.  If so, there are 
important implications for both innovation research and innovation policymaking. 
In the remainder of this paper, we provide a literature review on previous work on 
the incidence of user innovation and the transfer of user innovations, and on the 
economics of IP-protected and open innovation transfers (section 2). We then explain 
our research context and methods for our survey (section 3). We next report on our 
findings (section 4). The paper ends with a discussion (section 5).  
 
2. Literature Review 
 In this paper, we report upon empirical work that explores the development and 
transfer of process innovations by user-innovators.  We define user-innovators as firms or 
individual consumers that benefit from using a product or a service they develop. In 
contrast, producer-innovators are firms or individuals that benefit from selling a product 
or a service they develop. Lead users are a subset of all users.  Their primary 
distinguishing feature is that they are ahead of important market trends, and so experience 
new emerging needs ahead of the bulk of the market.  As a result, lead users often 
innovate in order to solve their own, ahead-of-market needs – often before producers are 
even aware of those new needs (von Hippel, 1988; 2005). 
In this section, we first briefly review studies exploring user innovation in process 
equipment.  Next, in order to create a platform for our discussion of innovation transfer 
patterns observed in our survey, we discuss the nature and economics of intellectual 
property rights, and the economics of “free” innovation transfer. Finally, we review what 
is currently known about the transfer of user innovations to producers. 
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2.1 User Innovation  
Empirical studies across many fields have found that process equipment users 
rather than equipment producers are the typical developers of process equipment 
innovations judged to be most important by equipment users and producers (Enos 1962, 
Freeman 1968, Lionetta 1977, von Hippel 1977, VanderWerf 1992).  Empirical studies 
across a range of fields and countries also – without exception - document that user 
development of process equipment is a common activity. Many user firms develop and 
modify process equipment to serve their own, in-house needs.  This is shown in both 
samples consisting of very specific, narrow categories of innovation, and also is shown 
in broad, multi-industry studies.   
Studies of user innovation frequencies affecting narrow categories of process 
innovation include Urban and von Hippel (1988), who found that 24.3% of a sample of 
136 U.S. users of printed circuit design software either modified commercial software or 
designed their own.  Morrison et al. (2000) found that 26% of 102 Australian libraries 
using OPACs - software-based library search systems – either designed their own 
systems or modified systems they had purchased. Lüthje (2003) found that 22% of a 
sample of 261 German surgeons affiliated with university clinics either modified their 
surgical equipment or devised new equipment.  Franke and von Hippel (2003) found that 
19% of a sample of 131 technically sophisticated Apache webmasters modified the 
security features of Apache software to better suit their needs.   
 Broad, multi-industry studies of the frequency of user development of process 
innovations show that more than 20% of process user firms develop process innovations 
and/or modifications for in-house use.  A cross-industry study by Statistics Canada 
surveyed a statistical sample of 4,200 Canadian manufacturing plants.  It showed that, for 
plants using one or more of 26 specific advanced production technologies, 28% had 
developed their own production equipment related to one or more of these technologies, 
and 26% had modified commercial equipment implementing these technologies to better 
serve their needs (Arundel and Sonntag 1999). A similar survey by Statistics Canada in 
2007 of 39 advanced production technologies found that 21%  had developed and 22% 
had modified one or more of these technologies (Statistics Canada 2008, Schaan and 
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Uhrback 2009). De Jong and von Hippel (2008) conducted a cross-industry study of a 
representative sample of 2,416 SMEs in the Netherlands, and found that 21% of all SMEs 
develop and/or significantly modify existing equipment or software to satisfy their own 
process-related needs.  
   
2.2 Economics of intellectual property rights 
The economic reasoning which has led governments to grant innovators 
intellectual property rights is familiar to many.  It begins with the assumption that private 
individuals and firms will invest in innovation only if and as they expect to make 
attractive profits from doing so.  If imitators can get free access to information innovators 
have spent money to develop, it seems reasonable that innovators’ profit expectations 
will drop: after all, they will then expect to be competing in the marketplace with 
imitators that have lower costs because they have been able to “free ride” on innovators’ 
investments. 
Free riding is likely because information is slippery stuff. For example, it has been 
shown that industrial secrets generally become known to competitors after only a short 
while.  Thus, Mansfield (1985) studied 100 American firms and found that “information 
concerning development decisions is generally in the hands of rivals within about 12 to 
18 months, on the average, and information concerning the detailed nature and operation 
of a new product or process generally leaks out within about a year.”  Indeed, research 
shows, perhaps as a consequence of such pervasive and rapid information spillovers, that 
social rates of return on innovation are generally higher than private rates of return.  This 
in turn implies that private rates of return should somehow be increased so that society 
gets “enough” innovation. 
There are many ways to increase innovators’ private returns from innovation to 
compensate for the effects of free riding by imitators.  For example, governments can and 
do offer R&D subsidies and tax credits to lower innovators’ private costs.  Governments 
also can and do enhance innovators’ private returns by granting those who qualify 
temporary monopolies on their innovation-related knowledge via intellectual property 
law.  Of course, economists and policymakers understand that encouraging innovators by 
granting even temporary monopoly rights to specific information, usually creates 
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significant economic costs that society must bear.  Innovators’ routes to increased profits 
involves restricting access to and/or charging fees for utilizing their protected 
information.  This information would otherwise be free and universally available – 
because information today is reproducible at a marginal cost close to zero.  The result is 
the creation of what is called a “deadweight loss” to the economy.  Patent and copyright 
owners can charge more than they could if access to the information was free.  
Additional applications of the information that would pay if only access were free are not 
undertaken – and this creates further economic loss.   
 
2.3 Economics of free revealing 
When we say that an innovator “freely reveals” proprietary information, we mean 
that the information is opened to others at no cost, and all parties are given equal access 
to it—the information becomes a public good (Harhoff, Henkel, and von Hippel 2003).  
Until the economics of free revealing began to be understood and appreciated, the losses 
associated with intellectual property rights, noted above, had seemed a necessary evil to 
both academics and policymakers.  For this reason, with occasional exceptions such as a 
well-known study by Machlup (1958), debates about the intellectual property system did 
not deal much with its fundamental desirability.  Instead they were largely restricted to 
the desirability of various refinements to the system, such as increasing or decreasing 
patent quality, and decreasing or increasing the length of a copyright grant.  An 
appreciation of the economics of voluntary free revealing has now changed the terms of 
this debate – because free revealing also encourages innovation via private rewards, but 
without requiring public grants of temporary legal monopolies to innovators.  
Routine and intentional spillovers of innovation-related knowledge developed by 
profit-seeking firms at private expense was first described by Allen (1983). He reported 
upon what he called collective invention in historical records from the nineteenth-century 
English iron industry. In that industry, Allen noted the surprising fact that employees of 
competing firms routinely publicly revealed information on their innovative furnace 
design improvements and related performance data in meetings of professional societies 
and in published material.   
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After Allen’s initial observation, a number of other authors searched for 
voluntary, intentional knowledge spillovers among profit-seeking firms and frequently 
found it. Nuvolari (2004) found similar voluntary spillovers in the early history of mine 
pumping engines. Contemporary voluntary spillovers by users has been documented by 
von Hippel and Finkelstein (1979) for medical equipment, by Lim (2000) for 
semiconductor process equipment, by Morrison, Roberts, and von Hippel (2000) for 
library information systems, and by Franke and Shah (2003) for sporting equipment. 
Henkel (2003) has documented free revealing among manufacturers in the case of 
embedded Linux software. 
More general interest in the phenomenon was sparked by the emergence of “open 
source” software development projects into public prominence in the 1990’s.  Clearly, it 
seemed to observers, open source software was a phenomenon of major economic 
importance – and, in the many open source software projects using the popular General 
Public License (GPL), it was enforced policy that project contributors would routinely 
and systematically freely reveal the software code they had developed at private expense 
to an information commons (Stallman 1998).   
Research into why innovators would freely reveal their innovations at no charge 
then taught how the behavior could be economically rational.  Innovators that freely 
revealed could still profit from their private innovation investments.  However, they were 
not doing so via the traditional route of temporary monopoly profits that intellectual 
property rights were designed to enable.  Routes to private profit via free revealing of 
innovations include increases in innovators’ reputations.  These could in turn increase the 
profits of innovating firms (Allen 1983) or the job prospects or salaries of individual 
contributors (Lerner and Tirole 2002).  Also, innovators granting costless access to their 
innovations usually increase its diffusion relative to what would occur if they charged 
fees for access.  Increased diffusion, in turn, often increases the value of the innovation to 
the innovator via what are called network effects.  (The classic example: the greater the 
number of people who adopt telephones, the greater value the telephone has for each 
owner: after all, there are more people to call.)    
It has also been learned by experience that innovators freely revealing their 
innovations often get valuable feedback and improvement suggestions and designs from 
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adopters (Raymond 1999).  Further, adopting manufacturers may be able to produce the 
innovation and sell it at a price lower than users’ in-house production costs (Harhoff et al, 
2003). In addition, individual participants in open and collaborative innovation projects 
such as open source software development projects, say they derive valuable private 
benefits from the fun and learning they gain from participation (Lakhani and Wolf 2005).  
In all of these diverse pathways to profit, the underlying principle is that you give 
away one thing – your innovation - and profit from a related increase in the value to you 
of that thing itself, and/or of related ‘complements’ (Teece 1986). When many users 
develop and contribute related innovation “options,” it has been shown that the private 
value to each user-innovator participating in the project is enhanced (Baldwin and Clark 
2006). The net result of all this research is a new appreciation of how innovators can 
actually profit by “giving away” innovations they develop at private expense. 
2.4 Innovation transfer from users to producers 
The transfer of innovations from user-innovators to producers can take several 
pathways.  Licensing or sale of user-developed intellectual property related to processes 
is often done in chemistry-related fields (Enos 1962, Freeman 1968).  Peer to peer 
transfer with no monetary transaction involved is a frequent pattern in open source 
software and other information products (Benkler 2006).  User-innovators also do 
sometimes start companies to produce commercially what they initially designed for 
their own use.  Von Hippel (1988) found this pattern to be relatively rare in the scientific 
instruments fields he studied. Shah (2000) found the pattern to be relatively common 
among developers of sporting equipment innovations. Shah and Tripsas (2007) found 
many user-innovators in the field of juvenile products ‘accidentally’ founded companies 
to produce their innovations when the products they created for their own use were 
observed by others and copies asked for.   
 Gault and von Hippel (2009) explored a sample of 1,219 Canadian manufacturing 
plants that had all developed new process equipment innovations for their own use, and/or 
had modified process equipment to better suit their needs.  Twenty five percent of these 
firms knew that one or more innovations they had developed had been adopted by process 
equipment producers. When asked about the terms under which they transferred 
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innovations to others, 75% of process modifiers and 47% of modifiers included transfers 
at no fee as a method they used.  User-innovators that had transferred their innovations 
reported that they did so to obtain various kinds of private benefit including: to allow a 
supplier to build a more suitable final product; to gain feedback and expertise; and, to 
enhance reputation.   
Baldwin et al (2006) have modeled the pathways commonly traversed as user 
innovations are transformed into commercial products. First, one or more users 
recognize a new set of design possibilities and begin to innovate. Users then join into 
communities, motivated by the increased efficiency of collective innovation. Transfer to 
producers then comes via some users forming small companies to produce user-
developed innovations for the community and others.  Over time, the nature and size of 
market demand becomes clearer via the activities of these pioneering users and firms. In 
cases where the emerging picture suggests significant commercial potential, larger 
manufacturers may choose to enter and/or user-founded firms may increase in size and 
significance. 
3. Research Context and Methods 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
The Dutch research institute EIM manages a panel of high-technology SMEs in 
the Netherlands which it surveys every year. The panel was created to explore the nature 
of high-tech SMEs’ business processes, and to assess the effectiveness of innovation and 
entrepreneurship policies (EIM, 2006). In the fall of 2007, EIM gave the authors of this 
paper permission to include several questions about user innovation in this annual 
survey, and the data and findings we report upon here are derived from responses to 
these questions. 
The panel defines high-tech firms as those who actively engage in R&D, and who 
develop and/or apply new technologies in their products (Grinstein and Goldman, 2006). 
They are innovative and process-intensive firms. Following the Dutch definition of 
SMEs, the panel contains only independent commercial organizations with 1-100 
employees. Data were collected with computer assisted telephone interviewing. During a 
period of four weeks in November and December 2007, surveys were completed with 
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514 of the 779 panelists (66%). Respondents were all directors or managers with a good 
overview of their firms’ practices, including innovation. It appeared that since the start 
of the panel (November 2005), 16 respondents had been purchased by larger 
organizations, or had grown to the point of having more than 100 employees. These 
respondents were discarded from further analysis. Our data therefore reflect answers by 
498 respondents.  Since all respondents were participants in a panel that had been 
surveyed before (EIM, 2006), we were able to enrich our data by including previously-
collected data on background variables such as industry classifications. 
 High tech SMEs, due to their distinguishing features, are mainly found in specific 
industries. Specifically, 8% were manufacturers of chemicals, rubbers and plastics 
(NACE codes 23-25); 24% were manufacturers of machinery and equipment (NACE 29-
33); 13% were active in other types of manufacturing including food and beverages, 
metals, textiles and wood products (NACE 15-22, 26-28, 34-37); 6% were technical 
wholesale traders (NACE 51.8); 19% were in IT and telecom services (NACE 72 and 
64.2); 25% in engineering and R&D services (NACE 73 and 74.2); and 5% in other types 
of services.  
 With respect to size of firms in our sample, 44% of the respondents had 1-9 
employees , 41% had 1049 employees, and 15% had 50-100 employees. In general, high 
tech SMEs tend to be somewhat bigger firms that regular Dutch SMEs (EIM, 2006). 
Comparisons of these distributions with the full sample of 779 panel members suggested 
that non-response bias was not present. Drawing on χ2-tests we found no significant 
differences for either industry types (p = 0.40) or size classes (p = 0.58).  
Survey variables and administration details 
In the high tech SME survey, we utilized two indicators of the presence or 
absence of user innovation: (1) had the respondent developed new process equipment or 
software for its own use; (2) had the respondent modified existing process equipment or 
software for its own use.  The boundary between user development of new equipment or 
software and user modification of existing equipment or software is not precise. 
Previous work has shown that even for new developments, innovating actors adapt and 
incorporate the components of existing machines and software into their new designs 
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(von Hippel, 1988; 2005). Both ‘development of new’ and ‘modification of existing’, 
therefore, can best be viewed as zones in a continuum. 
Our survey followed an identical procedure with respect to data collection for 
both user development of new process equipment or software, and user modification of 
existing equipment or software for own use.  In both cases we started with screening 
questions. First, user innovation development (or modification) was explicitly defined 
by the interviewer, and respondents were then asked if they had, within the past three 
years, developed any equipment or software for their own use because there was no 
market supply. All respondents answering affirmatively were next asked to describe the 
equipment or software they had developed or modified most recently, and to explain 
why they had done this. Our request to focus on respondents’ most recently-developed 
innovation had two advantages.  First, it implicitly identifies a random sample of 
research objects of user innovations within firms (Churchill, 1999). Second, because 
respondents provide details on recent examples that are still in the top of their minds, 
their answers are likely to be more reliable.   
The survey then continued with detailed questions on the innovation identified as 
most recent, including details regarding the involvement of other parties, firms’ 
expenditures, application of intellectual property rights (IPRs), whether producers had 
adopted their innovations, and more. Relevant variables that we used in the analyses 
presented hereafter are summarized in table 1.   
In five cases, we also gathered qualitative data on the particular circumstances of 
a transfer of a user process innovation to a producer.  These cases were collected by 
asking users in our sample that had transferred their innovations to a producer to identify 
that producer, and to supply a contact person – so that we could collect information from 
both sides of the transaction.  Of 90 respondents who said they had transferred their 
innovations, 28 were willing and able to supply this information to our telephone 
interviewers. We followed up half of these cases chosen at random, and received 
cooperation from five of the 14 producer contacts who had been identified by the users. 
(Five out of a group of 14 is a reasonable fraction: recruitment of the original panel of 
high-tech SMEs by EIM had found only one of three contacts willing to participate in 
the panel).    
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Table 1. Data collected for specific, “most recent” user innovations 
Category Variable Description Values 
Type Type(s) of user innovations developed within the past 3 years 0 (new development);  
1 (modification) 
Industry Industry type 0 (manufacturing);  
1 (services) 
Background 
variables 
Size Firm size  Number of employees 
Producer 
assistance 
Firm was supported by producers, for example with information, 
advice or specific contributions 
0 (no); 1 (yes) 
User assistance Firm collaborated with others users, e.g. for information, advice or 
specific contributions 
0 (no); 1 (yes) 
Networking 
Familiar with 
other users 
Firm knows other users realizing similar innovations 0 (no); 1 (yes) 
Time investment Estimated time invested to develop the innovation (answers given 
in person-years, -months, -week and/or -days, all recoded in 
person-days) 
Number of person-days 
Direct expenses  Estimated financial expenses, other than wages, to develop the 
innovation 
Amount in € 
Expenditures 
Total expenses Estimated total expenses (including wage costs) to develop the 
innovation 
Amount in € 
Protection Firm applied for IPRs to appropriate the innovation 0 (no); 1 (yes)  
Type of 
protection 
If yes, type of IPR 1 (patent)  
2 (trade mark)  
3 (copyrights)  
4 (trade secret) 
Willingness to 
share 
Multiple-item scale of four items (α = 0.83): 
‘Other parties interested in this innovation are welcome to inspect it 
and imitate it’ 
‘We are willing to share the design of this innovation with others’ 
‘We are willing to actively help others to adopt this innovation’ 
‘We are prepared to share this innovation for free’ 
 
1 (definitely not) 
2 (probably not) 
3 (neutral) 
4 (probably yes) 
5 (definitely yes) 
Transfer Firm is aware of any producer firm that adopted the innovation 0 (no); 1 (yes) 
Transfer 
Type of 
compensation 
If yes, firm received … to compensate for transferring the 
innovation 
0 (none/for free) 
1 (royalties) 
2 (informal/discount) 
 
Sample cleaning 
Our survey asked respondents to briefly describe their most recent process new 
developments or modifications. An example of a description of a new process 
development: “We developed a precision fertilizer application machine, steered by GPS, 
for use in our operation to create new types of plants.” An example of a description of a 
modification to an existing process:  “We use a specific device to test our products. The 
supplier’s software was adapted because it did not meet our requirements.”  
One important use for these descriptions was to screen our sample for any cases 
that did not appear to be innovations at all, or did not appear to be user innovations.  
Thus, the following case was excluded because it did not appear to be an innovation of 
any sort:  “My new stable burned down and I rebuilt it.”  Also, the following case was 
excluded because it appeared to be a producer innovation rather than a user innovation:  
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“We modified a machine we supply, to transport and install tomb-stones in narrow 
cemetery lanes. Our customers asked for it.”  
As a result of this screening, 13% of the cases in the sample of new user 
developments, and 10% of the cases in the sample of user modifications were discarded 
as not actually fitting our criteria.  The remaining sample contained details of 364 
reported user innovations.  
 
4. Findings 
In this section we first report upon the frequency and nature of process innovation  
by Dutch high tech SMEs.  We then report upon the transfer of many of these 
innovations to process equipment manufacturers. 
 
4.1 Frequency of user innovation 
Our survey found a high incidence of user process innovation among Dutch high-
tech SMEs.  As can be seen in Table 2, 54% percent of all respondents reported that, 
within the preceding 3 years, they had newly developed and/ or modified their own 
process equipment or software to satisfy their in-house needs.  Forty one percent 
reported developing new process equipment or software, and 32% reported modifying 
existing process equipment or software during this period.   
 
Table 2. Frequency of user process innovation in Dutch high-tech SMEs  
by industry type and size classes 
Industry type Size class (number of employees) Type of process 
innovation Total (n=498) Manufacturing 
(n=226) 
Services 
(n=272) F
b 1-9 
(n=218) 
10-49 
(n=205) 
50-100 
(n=75) F
a 
New development 41% 47% 36% 3.7^ 34% 44% 51% 3.4^ 
modification 32% 39% 26% 5.4^ 21% 37% 51% 11.2** 
New development 
or modification1 54% 62% 48% 6.3^ 43% 60% 71% 8.9** 
1 Respondents reported at least one process new development or modification. 
a Multivariate F-test controlling for industry type, b size class. 
** p < 0.001, * p < 0.01, ^ p < 0.05. 
 
As is also shown in table 2, SMEs with more employees were significantly more 
likely to report process innovations.  This is reasonable because more employees is 
likely to mean more sales – and the greater the amount of processing being done, the 
greater the return obtainable from any given process innovation (Klepper 1996).  
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Manufacturing user-innovator firms, controlling for firm size, were significantly more 
likely to develop process innovations than were service firms.  An inspection of 
innovation descriptions allowed us to discriminate between innovations implemented via 
software or via hardware in most but not all cases.  It appeared to us that manufacturers 
in our sample developed or modified hardware-related innovations about 90% of the 
time. In contrast, service firms developed about as many software innovations as 
hardware innovations.  
 
4.2 User innovation processes 
In table 3 we provide descriptive statistics related to the development of the 364 
user-developed process innovations in our sample under the two headings of 
expenditures and networking. 
 
 Table 3. Innovation process variables 
by type of user innovation, industry type and size classes 
Type of user innovation Industry type Size class (no. of employees) 
Variable Total (n=364) 
New 
develop
ment 
(n=204) 
modification 
(n=160) F
bc 
Manufact
uring 
(n=195) 
Services 
(n=169) F
ac 1-9 (n=121) 
10-
49 
(n=1
67) 
50-100 
(n=76) F
ab 
  
Expenditures  
Time investment 
(person-days) 196 282 86 30.9** 181 215 0.7 205 193 191 0.0 
Direct expenses  
(* € 1 000) 51.1 64.4 34.1 5.1^ 60.5 40.2 1.8 42.5 45.1 78.1 1.7 
Total expenses  
(* € 1 000) 184.4 235.0 119.8 6.1^ 194.6 172.5 0.4 176.8 177.7 211.3 0.3 
  
Networking  
Received producer 
assistance 41% 42% 40% 0.2 42% 41% 0.0 36% 40% 51% 2.4 
Received user 
assistance 24% 29% 18% 5.2^ 15% 35% 17.7** 32% 22% 16% 1.8 
Familiar with other 
users developing 
similar innovations 
39% 46% 30% 7.0* 28% 52% 17.8** 47% 36% 34% 0.6 
a Multivariate F-test controlling for type of user innovation, b industry type, c size class. 
** p < 0.001, * p < 0.01, ^ p < 0.05. 
 
Process development expenditures among Dutch high-tech SMEs were far from 
trivial – especially considering the often modest scale of these enterprises. As can be 
seen in table 3 under expenditures, high tech SMEs reported spending an average of € 
184,400 on their most recent user process innovation. This figure consists of an average 
time investment of 196 person-days, and an average direct (out-of-pocket) investment of 
€ 51,100.    
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Significance of difference tests confirm that user development of new process 
equipment or software are far more expensive than user modifications of existing 
equipment or software. The average cost incurred for a new development was €235,000, 
while the average cost for the most recent process modification was €119,800.  Direct 
expenses other than wages (items such as equipment and materials purchased for the 
innovation project) ranged from 0 to € one million, and estimated total expenses ranged 
from 1,000 euros to € 2.5 million. With respect to time invested, the number of person-
days varied from one (a simple modification in a software program) to 1,826 (five 
person-years spent on developing a diagnosis instrument for stem cell research).  
With respect to networking, 41% of respondents indicated that their innovation 
efforts had been supported by producers with information, advice or other contributions. 
Twenty four percent said they had cooperated with other users to develop their 
innovations.  Finally, 39% said they knew of other users developing similar innovations. 
 As can also be seen in Table 3, when we control for industry and size differences, 
newly developed user process equipment or software was significantly more likely to be 
developed with the help of other users than was a process modification (29% versus 
18%).  Users engaged in new developments were also significantly more likely than 
process modifiers to be familiar with other users developing similar innovations (46% 
versus 30%). With regard to type of industry, we found that services firms are more 
likely to be assisted by other users and to be aware of such users developing similar 
innovations. Finally, for size classes we found no significant differences on the 
networking variables reported in table 3. 
 
4.3 Innovation transfer from users to producers 
 Twenty five percent of the 364 process innovations in our sample were transferred 
from user-innovators to producer firms for commercial production and sale.  An identical 
fraction of both new user process equipment or software and user modifications were 
transferred (Table 4).  This 25% figure is likely to be conservative with respect to the 
total number of innovations in our sample transferred by some user to a producer.  As we 
saw in table 3, 39% percent of the respondents said they knew of other user firms that 
had developed innovations similar to theirs.  It is reasonable that, in some fraction of the 
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75% of cases where the innovator in our sample did not transfer its innovation to a 
producer, a similar innovation was transferred to a producer from an innovating user 
outside our set of respondents. 
 
Table 4. Innovation transfer-related variables 
by type of user innovation, industry type and size classes 
 
Type of user innovation Industry type Size class (no. of employees) 
Variable 
Total 
(n=36
4) 
New 
develop
ment 
(n=204) 
modification 
(n=160) F
bc 
Manufactu-
ring 
(n=195) 
Services 
(n=169) F
ac 1-9 (n=121) 
10-49 
(n=167) 
50-100 
(n=76) F
ab 
  
Innovation Transfer  
Innovation was 
transferred to 
producer 
25% 25% 25% 0.0 19% 31% 6.6^ 26% 25% 22% 0.2 
IP protection 
obtained 13% 17% 6% 8.5* 9% 16% 3.0 18% 11% 7% 1.3 
Willingness to share 
( scale 1-5) 2.35 2.28 2.43 1.5 2.16 2.59 10.2* 2.37 2.34 2.32 0.0 
a Multivariate F-test controlling for type of user innovation, b industry type, c size class. 
** p < 0.001, * p < 0.01, ^ p < 0.05. 
 
The transfer of 25% (90) of the innovations in our sample means that we have a 
‘transfer subsample’ too small for the statistical testing we would wish to do.  We can, 
however, report some interesting patterns and tendencies.  In 48% of the cases where the 
innovations were transferred, the innovations were given away without any direct 
compensation.  A further 39% were transferred with only informal promises of some 
form of direct compensation in the future, such as a promise of price reductions on 
possible future orders. Only 13% reported compensation via royalty agreements or direct 
money transfers.  In other words, half or more of the innovations transferred to 
producers were “given away for free.”   
Only 13% of user-innovators in our sample had acquired any form of intellectual 
property rights to protect their innovations. Ten percent said their innovations were 
patented, and a further 2% said they protected their innovations by explicit attempts to 
maintain it as a trade secret.  The remaining 1% reported copyrights or trademarks as the 
source of protection used. New process equipment or software was protected 
significantly more often than were process modifications (17% versus 6%). This may be 
because the former are more likely to contain genuinely new elements which are suitable 
for patenting. It may also be because user-innovators spend about twice as much on the 
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development of new hardware or software as they do on modifications, and so the 
incentive to protect may be higher.   
There was some relationship between IP protection obtained and the likelihood of 
receiving financial compensation for a transfer. Due to the small number of respondents, 
however, these differences were not statistically significant. In our dataset, 14 
respondents reported transferring an innovation that they had protected by some form of 
IPR. Seventy one percent of these reported receiving some kind of compensation – 
either a royalty agreement (21 percent) or informal promises of compensation (50 
percent) from the producer. In contrast, only 47% of 74 respondents that had transferred 
their innovations without IPR protection had received any compensation. More 
specifically, 11% received royalties and 36% received informal promises of 
compensation.  
  The fact that half of innovations transferred were transferred at no fee to a specific 
producer does not mean that user-innovators were willing to give their innovations away 
to anyone or everyone for free. We tested this idea by asking respondents whether they 
would be willing to give access to all interested parties without direct payment or other 
compensation. Being a latent construct, willingness to share was measured with a 
multiple-item scale of four items described in Table 1.  The items have good reliability (α 
= 0.83).  The mean score of the four-item scale was 2.35 – somewhere between “probably 
not” and neutral on the question of free sharing.  
 
4.4 Generally-useful and valuable innovations are preferentially transferred 
The previous section laid out evidence that at least 25% of user-developed 
innovations are transferred to producers for general sale.  In this section we consider 
whether the innovations transferred to producers tend to be the more generally useful 
ones, and the ones that provide more value to user-innovators.  In overview, we do find 
a strong association between these factors and likelihood of transfer.  When variables 
associated with the likely general utility and value of an innovation are at a low level, 
transfer probabilities are lower than 20%.  When all these variables are at relatively high 
levels, transfer probabilities exceed 70%.  
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We explored this matter via a range of binary logistic regression models.  The 
dummy variable of user innovation transfer to producers was the dependent variable. As 
independent variables, we entered items from our survey that we thought had a 
reasonable relationship to the general utility and value of an innovation.  With respect to 
general utility, we reasoned that innovations for which a user-innovator receives help 
from a producer are likely to be more generally valuable.  Producers, we thought, might 
well prefer to help develop innovations they think likely to have general marketplace 
appeal. Second, we reasoned that if respondents had received help from other users in 
developing an innovation, that was a signal that the innovation was of interest to 
multiple members of the user community. Third, we reasoned that when respondents 
knew of other users that had developed an innovation similar to theirs, that was a sign 
the innovation had more marketplace potential.  With respect to the per-user value of an 
innovation, we entered time and money spent on the innovations as variables.  We 
reasoned that the more costly a user innovation is to develop, the more profit-enhancing 
it was likely to be for the innovating user – and possibly for other users as well.    
We also tested the dummy variable with respect to the presence or absence of IP 
protection, and the multiple-item measure for user innovators’ general willingness to 
share. Both variables may be associated with the likelihood of transfer to a producer. In 
the case of IP protection, innovators may be more likely to invest in protecting attractive 
innovations.  In the case of willingness to share, an expressed general willingness to 
share may be associated with reduced barriers to transfer.  Finally, we entered dummies 
for the type of innovation (new equipment or software development versus 
modifications) and industry (manufacturing versus services), as well as an indicator for 
firm size (number of employees) to control for the potential influence of the background 
variables on the likeliness of transfer. 
Before we estimated our models, the variables for firm size, time investment and 
direct expenditures were logistically transformed, because descriptive statistics had 
revealed that these variables violated the assumed normal distribution (absolute values 
of skewness and/or kurtosis > 2). We also checked if our independent variables suffered 
from potential multicollinearity. The correlation of total expenditures with the other cost 
indicators was > 0.80, and so we excluded this variable from our analyses. For the 
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remaining variables, the highest correlation was between log transformed time 
investment and log transformed direct expenses (r = 0.60), while all other correlations 
were < 0.40. In such instances, multicollinearity is very unlikely (Hair et al., 1998). All 
these statistics are not reported here due to space limitations, but available on request.  
We first estimated an empty model (intercept only) to obtain baseline values for 
the transformed loglikelihood value (-2LL) which is used to assess model fit. Other 
frequently-used indicators to evaluate the results include Wald tests (to test the 
significance of individual independent variables) and Nagelkerke’s R2 (which is a 
pseudo R2-statistic with a theoretical maximum of 1.0, indicating strength of association 
in the overall model) (Hair et al., 1998). Table 5 shows the results. The first model gives 
a baseline for the transformed loglikelihood value of 402.6.  
 
Table 5. Binary logistic regression models of  
transfer to producer firms (n=364) 
  I II III IV V VI VII VIII  IX X 
Control variables and intercept:   
Intercept -1.11** -1.50** -1.94** -1.90** -1.95** -2.72** -2.96** -1.71** -1.94** -4.37** 
Dummy services industry  .66* .69** .47^ .42 .58* .74* .67** .53* .39 
Log firm size  .04 -.01 .14 .06 -.12 -.13 .13 .03 -.56 
Dummy user modification  .02 .03 .15 .19 .29 .51 .09 -.08 .49 
Independent variables:  
Producer assistance   1.02**       .64^ 
User assistance    1.08**      .37 
Familiar with other users     1.10**     .90* 
Log time investment      .76**    .29 
Log direct expenses       .77**   .40 
Protection        .37  -.06 
Willingness to share         .22* .28^ 
Fit measures:  
Nagelkerke R-squared  .028 .094 .087 .099 .094 .099 .035 .045 .230 
-2LL 402.6 395.7 379.2 381.0 378.2 380.7 383.0 394.7 390.7 369.2 
∆-2LL   6.9 16.5 14.7 17.5 15.0 12.7 1.0 5.0 26.5 
∆df  3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
significance   ^ ** ** ** ** **   * ** 
** p < 0.001, * p < 0.01, ^p < 0.05. 
 
Model II added our control variables to the equation: a dummy for services 
industries, log transformed firm size and a dummy for user process modifications. This 
significantly diminished the transformed loglikelihood value (Δ -2LL = 6.9 with Δdf = 
3, p < 0.05), implying that when taken together, the independents are linearly related to 
the log odds of the transfer of user innovations to producer firms. Wald tests on the 
individual parameters showed that in services industries, users are more likely to see 
their innovations transferred to producers. For firm size and type of user innovation, no 
significant effect parameters were found.  
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Models III-IX test our presuppositions that the likelihood of transfer is associated 
with indicators for utility and value of the innovations. For example, model III tests if 
user innovations are more likely to be transferred to producer firms when users were 
assisted by producers. Adding this indicator to the equation significantly improves 
model fit (-2LL = 16.5 with Δdf = 1, p < 0.001) while Nagelkerke’s R2 = 0.094. As the 
effect parameter is very significant too (b = 1.02, p < 0.001), producer assistance 
increases the odds of seeing user innovations being transferred to producers. More 
specifically, in case of producer assistance it is exp(1.02) = 2.8 times more likely that 
user innovations will be transferred. 
For the other indicators shown in table 5, we see that the relationship with transfer 
is significant as well, so it is confirmed that the likelihood of transfer is associated with 
the general utility and value of the innovations. One exception was, however, that 
adding a parameter for IP protection to the equation did not improve model fit.  It may 
be that two opposite tendencies are canceling each other out in this case.  Some users 
may utilize IPR protections because they do not want to see their innovations 
transferred.  Others may protect innovations because they do want to transfer them, and 
think intellectual property protection will increase the likelihood that they will receive 
financial compensation.  
Model X gives a more robust test of the influence of all independent variables. 
After entering all independent variables together, we find that producer assistance, being 
familiar with other users and willingness to share are significant, and apparently the 
most important correlates of transfer.  
We also evaluated the odds of transfer for low and high values of the independent 
variables in model X. When evaluated at low values (dummy variables at zero, and 
continuous variables at one standard deviation below their mean scores), the share of 
transferred user innovations were estimated for various combinations of the control 
variables.  At low values of the independent variables, the estimated share of transferred 
user innovations was in the range of 6% to 18%.  When evaluated at high values, we 
found that the estimated share of transferred innovations was always in the range of 71% 
to 89%.  These findings clearly illustrate that indicators of general utility and value (and 
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likely commercial attractiveness from a producer’s point of view) are strongly correlated 
with the likelihood of user innovation transfer. 
 
4.5 Innovation transfer case histories 
Five brief case histories of user-innovation development followed by transfers to 
producers will give the reader a richer flavor for the particulars of this kind of activity.  
 
Case 1: Improvement to vegetable processing machine 
 
• User A is a developer and producer of specialty foods for allergic patients. User A 
reported that it had modified an existing commercial vegetable-processing 
machine by developing a new input chamber for it.  The input chamber for the 
machine can be visualized is a very large metal box with a hole in bottom.  Raw 
vegetables to be processed are put into the top of the input chamber.  They then 
flow from the bottom of the chamber into the processing machinery as needed.  
User A regularly processed carrots, and found that his producer-designed input 
chamber was shaped in such a way that the carrots, rather than aligning in a single 
orientation, ended up in a jumble - pressing against each other in a way that 
caused many to break.  This created a great deal of waste. User A designed and 
built a new hexagonal input chamber that caused the carrots to align better and so 
greatly reduced breakage. Design and construction of the new input chamber took 
25 person-days and € 15 000 out-of-pocket costs.  
 
• Supplier A, is a machine manufacturer for the food industry with close ties to 
User A.  Supplier A had produced the machine that User A had modified, and was 
allowed to copy the user innovation for free. Supplier A then generalized the user-
invented idea of different hopper shapes for different vegetables into a new line of 
add-on feed hoppers to its processing machines, to better adapt to the specific 
shapes of the wide range of input materials processed by its customers. At the 
time of our phone call, the manufacturer had invested about € 20 000 in making 
the user-developed input chamber suitable for production, and about € 100 000 in 
further development of the full line of input chambers inspired by the user 
innovation.  
 
Case 2: Novel CAD/CAM software for architectural application 
 
• User B is a engineering firm specializing in complex architectural restoration 
projects such as major church restorations. To accomplish this work, it uses 3D 
measurement instruments to precisely measure architectural elements that must be 
replicated such as deteriorated elements of statues. The output from the 
measurement instruments must then be converted into the digital files needed to 
drive the computerized machines that precisely create replacement parts.  User B 
developed a new software tool to automatically perform this task. The software 
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tool was programmed by three employees in an estimated 120 person-days. To 
integrate the application with current CAD/CAM software, User B also recruited 
external programmers (at the expense of € 75 000) from Supplier B, a producer of 
CAD/CAM software.  
 
• Supplier B adopted the user-developed tool and sells it as a software product. 
Additional development expenses by supplier B prior to putting it on the market 
were estimated by the supplier to be 20 person-days – 20% of the user’s 
development effort.  User A is compensated for its innovation by Supplier B 
according to the terms of an informal royalty agreement.  
 
Case 3: Improved sugar melting machine 
 
• User C is a manufacturer of bakery products for the health sector (hospitals, 
outpatient care centers). Its new head of production, a former machine 
constructor, was dissatisfied with the commercial sugar melting machine used in 
User C’s production line.  Melted sugar would often recrystalize in the pipes 
transferring the melted sugar to the bakery mixing machines, causing pipe 
blockages and expensive production downtime.  The head of production ordered a 
new melting machine from Supplier C and improved it by installing new blades, 
increased mechanical power, and smooth coatings in some key pipe parts. He 
spent an estimated € 200 000 on wage costs and deliveries of new parts.  
 
• The innovation was adopted by supplier C, a wholesale trader in machines and 
equipment and, as noted above the supplier that had delivered the new sugar 
melting machine to User C. Supplier C did not conduct any follow-up research or 
development activities, but rather benefited by replicating User C’s modifications 
in sugar melting machines delivered to other customers.   
 
Case 4: Improved horticultural robot 
 
• User D is a horticulture enterprise specialized in improving orchids. Its director 
was dissatisfied with his internal transport system in which a robot transports 
trays of orchids within the firm’s greenhouses. By modifying the robot’s arms its 
accuracy was significantly improved, which enabled a higher density of plants per 
square meter. The modification took an estimated 60 person-days and additional 
expenses of € 2 000.  
 
• Supplier D is an engineering firm specializing in greenhouse construction, and in 
equipment used in greenhouses. Supplier D had supplied the robot transport 
machine that User D modified.  Supplier D was allowed to copy the improved 
robot arm for free, and adopted it for production ‘without much additional 
investment’.  The new robot arm is now part of all internal transport systems 
which Supplier D delivers to greenhouse customers.   
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Case 5: Modification of a food filling machine 
 
• User E is a food and nutrition firm of Turkish origin, developing and producing 
new yogurts, cheeses and beverages. After the foods are produced, they must be 
packaged.  The innovation relates to the modification of a package filling machine 
used to pump yogurts into containers. In User firm E, an engineer modified the 
filling head of the machine, and improved the cover closing process so that air 
was more effectively excluded from the product.  This reduced product spoilage. 
The innovation was realized in 20 days and out-of-pocket expenses of  € 15 000.  
 
• Supplier E, a producer of food and agricultural machinery, met the 
owner/manager from User firm E at a trade conference. He was allowed to inspect 
the modification and to copy it. There was no explicit compensation, except a 
promise that User E would be generously treated in case of future orders from 
supplier E. Supplier E adopted the improved cover closing mechanisms for some 
of its own machines, spending about € 10 000 on additional development 
activities. 
 
Table 6. Estimated user and producer development expenditures and forms 
of compensation in five cases 
Case User development 
expenses 
Producer development 
expenses 
Compensation 
A € 21 250 € 20 000 None 
B € 105 000 € 5 000 Informal royalty agreement (no 
written contract) 
C € 200 000  € 0 None 
D € 17 000 minimal None 
E € 20 000 € 10 000  Promise of price reductions on 
future orders 
a In some cases, costs were reported to us in days of engineering time plus direct expenditures.  To 
arrive at the total expenditures shown in such cases, we converted engineering days into Euros by 
using the average wage of a Dutch process engineer with 15 years of tenure in 2008 of € 250 / day.  
(This figure excludes overhead, and so is conservative.)  (See www.intermediair.nl/salariskompas) 
 
In table 6 we summarize cost and compensation details of the five cases. 
Statistical inferences are of course not possible with such a small sample, but three 
interesting patterns can be seen. First, note that, with the exception of case A, all users 
invested significantly more to develop their innovations than did the adopting producers. 
Second, in these cases SME user-innovators did not market their innovations 
systematically – they simply agreed to a transfer request made by a producer who had 
learned of their innovation via a preexisting supply relationship with the innovating user. 
 25 
Finally, notice that, in line with the findings in our total survey sample, the producers 
adopting user innovations for commercial sale did not financially compensate the user-
innovators in 3 of 5 cases, and in the remaining 2 cases compensation was informally 
agreed upon.   
 
5. Discussion 
In our sample of 498 Dutch, high tech, SME firms, we found that 54% of these 
firms newly develop or modify the process equipment or software they use in-house at 
significant private expense. Recall from our literature review that this fraction of user 
innovators is significantly higher than that reported in previous studies. We suggest two 
factors that may be causative.  First, ours is the first study including only high tech 
SMEs.  Recall that ‘high tech’ SMEs are defined in the Netherlands as firms of between 
1 and 100 employees that actively engage in R&D, and develop and/or apply new 
technologies in their products.  Such high-tech SMEs are only 3-4% of the total 
population of Netherlands SMEs, and they engage in more innovation than the average 
SME (EIM, 2006).  Second, in this survey we ask about any type of process innovation, 
while most earlier studies inquired about whether firms had innovated in much narrower 
process categories.  Presumably, the broader the range of allowable innovations, the 
higher will be the rate of innovation reported. 
 We also found that 25% of the user process developments and modifications asked 
about in our survey were transferred to process equipment and software producers. As was 
described in our literature review, Gault and von Hippel (2009) found similar patterns 
with respect to user innovation and transfer.  The general agreement found between these 
two studies offers a very important reliability check.  It also shows that the phenomenon 
we document here is likely to be quite general.  Our study examined high-tech SMEs with 
from 1 to 100 employees across a range of industries.  The sample for the Gault and von 
Hippel (2009) study was drawn from a population of 16,590 Canadian manufacturing 
establishments that met the criteria of having at least $250,000 in revenues, and at least 20 
employees.  
In our study, we found indications that the user process innovations most likely to 
be transferred are those of most value to the innovating user – as indicated by the high 
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expenditures made to develop them - and also of more general interest to the user 
community.  We suggest that these are very important findings. Consider that, when 
users develop a process innovation, general diffusion is not a given: users, unlike 
manufacturers, can benefit from a process innovation without diffusing or selling it, via 
their own in-house use.  If user innovations of high value to adopters and of utility to 
many adopters are diffused, user innovation becomes a much more socially-efficient 
process: each interested user need not invest resources to (re)develop a similar 
innovation for itself.  One would assume that innovations of higher value and more 
general utility are the ones likely to offer the most potential licensing returns to user-
innovators should they elect to follow this route – yet, as we saw, 48% of the transferred 
innovations were given away to producers by user-innovators without any 
compensation.  This suggests that user-innovators often anticipate that their private 
returns from non-compensated transfers will outweigh the private returns they could 
expect from keeping even their most valuable and generally-useful innovations private 
and/or selectively licensing them.   
Most of our user-innovators were not enthusiastic about “freely revealing” their 
innovations to all – the pattern described in our literature review.  On average, we found 
that the user-innovators were between neutral and slightly negative with respect to the 
idea of transferring their innovations to anyone at no cost.  Yet, as we saw, about half of 
the transfers to producers were in fact made without any direct compensation. How can 
we reconcile these two findings?  We think that it is likely that user-innovators in our 
sample are more favorable to the idea of transferring their innovations at no cost to 
specific suppliers with whom they have a preexisting relationship than they are to free 
revealing to anyone and everyone.  This more selective revealing pattern is visible in our 
5 case studies.  Of course, even selective revealing to a producer gives all users and 
producers in the marketplace access to the innovation-related information via the route 
of either inspection and/or purchase of the innovation from that producer.  
 It is also likely that the “incumbent producer” in a particular case can gain more 
profit from a particular innovation than can other producers.  When a machine or software 
program modified by a user-innovator was originally produced by the firm to which the 
modification is transferred, the adopting producer has a significant additional advantage 
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over other producers that might contemplate adopting that same innovation.  Since the 
user modification has been prototyped and tested on his particular design of machine or 
software, the incumbent producer has less cost and risk in adopting the user innovation: 
the modification has been engineered by the user to function with that producer’s specific 
design. 
 When many users develop and freely contribute related innovation “options,” it 
has been shown that the private value to each user-innovator participating in the project is 
enhanced (Baldwin and Clark 2006). It is therefore very interesting to observe that even 
users acting without collaborators, and innovating independently rather than as part of a 
collaborative development project such as an open source software development project, 
sometimes engage in fee-free transfers.  If the added benefit from collaborative work is at 
least sometimes not needed to induce fee-free revealing, this greatly increases the 
likelihood that this behavior will be broadly present in many sectors of the economy.  
 Is fee-free transfer of innovations “a good thing” from the social welfare 
perspective?  It certainly offers a benefit with respect to the particular innovation 
transferred. As was mentioned earlier, charging a price for something that exceeds the 
marginal cost of production creates a deadweight loss.  Charging anything for 
information – as all innovators do that report charging a fee for their innovation-related 
information – inevitably creates a deadweight loss.  After all, the marginal cost of 
production of copies of encoded innovation-related information today is essentially zero.  
 But social welfare is also affected by the number of innovations created.  Does 
fee-free distribution discourage user innovation relative to the alternative of charging a 
fee?  This assumption is at the core of the case for intellectual property systems.  Recall 
that the justification of granting intellectual property rights is largely to, as the U.S. 
Constitution puts it, “…promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts…”  However, 
our data does not support this link – at least, not as a general matter.  Consider that it is 
likely that both fee free and fee-based transfer options were available to many of the user-
innovators developing process innovations in our sample.  After all, at least trade secrecy 
protection is always applicable in the case of process innovations that can be used by 
user-innovators while hidden behind factory walls. Yet, despite the availability of this 
and probably other intellectual property mechanisms to support exclusivity and the ability 
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to charge fees for access, about half of the survey respondents choose to transfer their 
innovations at no fee.  Given economic rationality on the part of respondents, this 
suggests that, some significant fraction of the time, innovators think that free transfer 
gives them greater private returns than does utilizing the monopoly rights enabled by the 
intellectual property rights system.   
 In sum, our research findings indicate that many user firms develop and modify 
process equipment and software at significant private cost, and that many of the most 
valuable of these user-developed innovations are transferred to producer firms – often at 
no fee.  In our discussion, we have argued that this pattern of user innovation followed by 
general diffusion by producers is likely to enhance social welfare.  It also clearly will 
affect innovation management prescriptions and government policymaking as well.  We 
suggest that further research is merited.  
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